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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-CONGRESSIONAL

ABROGATION OF THE

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT-STATES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO SUITS IN
FEDERAL COURT BROUGHT BY PRIVATE PARTIES PURSUANT TO
THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT

United States v. Union Gas (1986)*
The eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution' has
been construed as granting sovereign immunity to the states in suits
brought against them in federal court by private parties. 2 This general
* This article was written solely from the materials available to the Third
Circuit at the time of its decision. Thus, it does not consider the impact of the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, PUB. L. No. 99-499.
After adoption of these amendments, the United States Supreme Court granted
certoniarifor this case. The Court vacated the Third Circuit's decision in light of
the amendments and remanded. United States v. Pennsylvania, 107 S.Ct. 865
(1987). The Third Circuit reversed, and found sufficient evidence in the
amendments to manifest Congress' intent to abrogate the eleventh amendment.
United States v. Union Gas, 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987). It is submitted that
the amendments and the court's new holding further support the interpretation
set forth in this article of Congress' intent in the CERCLA legislation.
1. The eleventh amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend XI.
The eleventh amendment was ratified shortly after the Supreme Court in
1793 had assumed original jurisdiction over a suit brought by a citizen of South
Carolina against the State of Georgia. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419
(1793). The Court believed it had jurisdiction over the suit because of Article
III, section 2 of the Constitution, which provides that the federal judicial power
extends, inter alia, to controversies between "a State and Citizens of another
State." Id. at 474-75 (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2). The eleventh amendment
overruled the particular result in Chisholm, since it clearly prohibits federal
courts from hearing a suit brought by the citizens of one state against a foreign
state. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. This immunity has been extended to bar suits
brought against a state by its own citizens, although the amendment does not
explicitly provide for such extension. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)
(state cannot be sued in federal court, without its consent, by one of its own
citizens). The validity of Hans has been reinforced recently by the Supreme
Court in Welch v. State Department of Highways and Public Transportation,
107 S.Ct. 2941 (1987), even though, for the fourth time in little more than two
years, four members of the Court urged for the overruling of Hans. Id. at 2948.
2. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98
(1984) (significance of eleventh amendment is its affirmation that sovereign immunity limits grant of judicial authority in Article III); Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (unconsenting state is immune from suits brought in federal court by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another state). But see
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 78 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
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rule, however, is not without exception. First, a state may
munity and consent to suit in federal court without the
barred by the eleventh amendment. 3 Second, enforcement
stitutional state statute by a state official can be enjoined

waive its imaction being
of an unconby a federal

court. 4 Third, Congress may abrogate state immunity by statutorily pro-

viding for suits against states. 5 In the third situation, courts have been
Amendment was intended simply to remove federal-court jurisdiction over suits
against a State where the basis for jurisdiction was that the plaintiff was a citizen
of another state or an alien."); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
247-80 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (providing in depth history of eleventh
amendment jurisprudence in support of same conclusion); Gibbons, The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV.
1889, 2004 (1983) ("It is time for the Supreme Court to acknowledge that the
eleventh amendment applies only to cases in which thejurisdiction of the federal
court depends solely upon party status.").
3. States can also waive their sovereign immunity by consenting to be sued
in federal court. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S.
459 (1945) (state's immunity from suit may be waived). The United States
Supreme Court summed up the methods by which a state can waive its
immunity:
A State may effectuate a waiver of its constitutional immunity by a state
statute or constitutional provision, or by otherwise waiving its immunity to suit in the context of a particular federal program. In each of
these situations, we require an unequivocal indication that the State intends to consent to federal jurisdiction that otherwise would be barred
by the Eleventh Amendment.
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 n.1 (1985).
4. In Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court ruled that a
suit against a state official to enjoin enforcement of an unconstitutional state
statute is not a suit against the state, and hence is not barred by the eleventh
amendment. Id. at 160. The Court reasoned that the state statute was void because it was unconstitutional, and therefore, it could not impart any state immunity to the individual state official. Id. at 159-60. The Court concluded that
since the state could not authorize the official's action pursuant to an unconstitu-

tional state statute, he was "stripped of his official or representative character"
and thereby was "subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual
conduct." Id. at 160.
According to one commentator, Young rests upon "the fiction that an injunction against officers in their representative capacities does not affect the
state, even though the effect is to hinder the state's ability to enforce its laws."
Note, Confronting the Fictions of the Eleventh Amendment: Pennhurst State School and
Hospitalv. Halderman, 60 WASH. L.R. 407, 414 (1985). Commenting on this fiction which underpins the Young case, one writer has observed:
When you sue the government ... you must falsely pretend ... that the
suit is not against the government but that it is against an officer ....
The judges often will falsely pretend that they are not giving you relief
against the sovereign, even though you know and they know, and they
know that you know, that the relief is against the sovereign.
Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretendingto Sue an Officer, 29 U. Ci. L. REv.

435, 435 (1962).
Even though the Young case does not constitute a true exception to the general rule articulated at note 2 of this article since the suit is not "truly" against
the state, the commentators above concur that such a suit is, in effect, one
against the state; thus, 1Young is an exception to the general rule.
5. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (legislative history of stat-
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faced with numerous types of statutes which do not expressly provide
that "eleventh amendment immunity is abrogated.''6 These courts,
therefore, must decide whether such statutes can be construed as abroute contained evidence of Congressional intent to abrogate states' immunity);
Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled, 107 S. Ct. 2941
(1987) (state-owned railway qualified as "employer" in statute making employers subject to federal regulation, thereby subjecting state to suit in federal
court).
Congress derives its power to abrogate the eleventh amendment in a
number of ways. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (eleventh amendment is limited by enforcement provision of fourteenth amendment); Parden v.
Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (Congress may abrogate state immunity
under commerce clause of U.S. Constitution), overruled, 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987);
County of Monroe v. Florida, 678 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1982) (Congress may abrogate state immunity under article IV of U.S. Constitution as to extradition), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1104 (1983); Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070
(5th Cir. 1979) (Congress may abrogate state immunity under congressional war
powers of U.S. Constitution); Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th
Cir. 1979) (Congress may abrogate state immunity under copyright and patent
clause of U.S. Constitution).
On a related issue, concerning the limitations on Congress' power to regulate state activity imposed by the tenth amendment, the Court has held that
"[c]ongress may not exercise [its power to regulate commerce] so as to force
directly upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the
conduct of integral governmental functions are to be made." National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976). In a subsequent case, however, the
same Court specifically overruled Usery and dispensed with the "integral/nonintegral governmental functions" distinction for determining whether Congress
has the power to regulate a state's activity. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia, the Court rejected "a rule of state
immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a
particular governmental function is 'integral' or 'traditional.' " Id. at 546-47.
For a discussion of the relationship between the recent Supreme Court's
tenth and eleventh amendment jurisprudence, see Brown, State Sovereignty Under
the Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth: Some
Broader Implications of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 GEO. LJ. 363 (1985).
6. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (plaintiff
sought damages in federal court from state hospital that received federal financial assistance, under federal statute conferring right of action upon handicapped people who have been discriminated against by "any recipient of federal
assistance"); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (claimant sued state for attorney's fees under federal statute containing general language referring to neither
eleventh amendment nor suits against states); Employees v. Missouri Pub.
Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (employees of state health facilities sued employer in federal court under federal statute providing cause of action against
"any employer" in one provision and defining "employer" as including "states"
in another provision); Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (employees of state-run railroad brought suit against employer in federal court under
federal statute providing cause of action against "every common carrier by railroad" engaging in interstate commerce), overruled, 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987); Welch
v. Department of Highways & Pub. Transp., 780 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1986) (employee suit for damages against Texas Highway Department in federal court
pursuant to federal statute providing cause of action for "any seaman" against
employer for injuries incurred in cause of employment), cert. granted, 107 S.Ct.
58 (1986), aff'd, 107 S.Ct. 2941 (1987).
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gating the eleventh amendment without an express statement. 7 In
United States v. Union Gas, 8 the United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit was faced with this issue where the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) extended a private right of action in the liability portion of the statute
against specified "persons" without stating in that section whether a
state may be sued under the statute. 9 The definitional section of CERCLA, however, defines the term "persons" to include "states," thereby
creating ambiguity as to whether immunity was abrogated.' 0 In setting
forth guidelines for determining how specific Congress must be in order
to abrogate a state's immunity, the Third Circuit held that a plaintiff's
claim under the liability section in CERCLA was barred by the eleventh
amendment because CERCLA does not evidence the necessary congressional intent to abrogate the immunity. II
Union Gas Company owned land proximate to Brodhead Creek in
Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, and sold part of this land in 1953 and 1970
to Pennsylvania Power and Light which in turn granted easements over
7. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985)
("[G]eneral authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind of unequivocal
statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment."); Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (extensive legislative history containing references
to suits against states is sufficient evidence to indicate Congressional intent to
abrogate eleventh amendment); Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184
(1964) (since Congress did not carve exception for states when enacting statute
subjecting "every common carrier" liable under its provisions Congress meant
to deprive states of immunity under eleventh amendment), overruled, 107 S. Ct.
2941 (1987); Welch v. Department of Highways & Pub. Transp., 780 F.2d 1268
(5th Cir. 1986) (suit against state by private party barred by eleventh amendment absent specific congressional language in statute itself requiring abrogation of immunity), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 58 (1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2941
(1987).
8. 792 F.2d 372 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. granted and vacated, 107 S. Ct. 865

(1987).
9. CERCLA (popularly known as "Superfund") was signed into law on December 11, 1980. Pua. L. No. 56-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982)). This legislation empowers the executive branch
to determine and implement appropriate responses to public health threats
posed by the existence of hazardous wastes in the environment. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9604 (1982). The liability portion of CERCLA provides:
[A]ny person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such substances were disposed
of... shall be liable for any other necessary costs of response incurred
by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan ....
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982).
10. The definitional section provides that a "person" means:
an individual, firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium,
joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a state, or any interstate

body.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982) (emphasis added).
11. 792 F.2d at 383.
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the land to the Borough of Stroudsburg. 12 In early 1980, the borough
assigned its easements to the state of Pennsylvania. 13 On October 7,
1980, the state was excavating on its easements when it struck a large
deposit of coal tar which had been deposited there three years earlier by
a former owner of the property. 14 The coal tar seeped into the creek,
and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ordered the site to be
cleaned. 1 5 The state, jointly with the federal government, cleaned the
creek.1 6 The federal government reimbursed the state $720,000 for its
costs. 17

The United States then sued Union Gas in federal court under
CERCLA for recoupment of its clean-up costs, which included the
$720,000 it paid to the state. 18 Union Gas filed a third-party complaint
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' 9 naming Pennsylvania
a third-party defendant, alleging that the state had negligently contributed to the discharge of coal tar. 20 The district court granted the state's
motion to dismiss the third-party claim on the ground that the eleventh
amendment barred the claim. 2 1 After resolution of the suit, 22 Union
12. Id. at 374.
13. Id.
14. Id. Predecessors of Union Gas owned and operated a water gas plant

near Brodhead Creek between 1890 and 1948, after which the plant was dismantled. Id.
15. Id. The EPA derives its power to order hazardous waste sites to be cleaned up from the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921, et. seq. (1976).
16. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 374. The President of the United States can
make agreements with the affected state to help clean the waste site, pursuant to
CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(c), (d). In Union Gas, Pennsylvania jointly with the
federal government undertook clean-up of the waste site. 792 F.2d at 374.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 374-75. The United States claimed that the coal tar had been
deposited into the ground as a by-product of Union Gas' and its predecessors'
carburetted water gas processing, and therefore that Union Gas was liable as an
"owner" for clean-up costs. Id. at 375.

19. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a) provides:
At any time after commencement of the action a defending party, as a
third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served
upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to the
third party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the
third party plaintiff ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
20. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 375. Union Gas alleged that the State of Pennsylvania's recent excavation at Brodhead Creek and earlier construction of dikes
and levees by the State and the Borough of Stroudsburg-work that was made
necessary due to flooding-had negligently caused or contributed to the discharge of coal tar into the creek. Id.
21. Id. (citing United States v. Union Gas, 575 F. Supp. 949 (E.D. Pa. 1983),
cert. granted and vacated, 107 S. Ct. 865 (1987)). The district court granted the
state's motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(l)
and 12(b)(6). Id.
22. On the understanding that Union Gas and the United States reached a
settlement, the District Court of Pennsylvania dismissed the federal govern-
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Gas appealed to the Third Circuit, citing as error the court's denial of its
23
third-party claim against the state.
Judge Becker, writing for the majority, began his analysis with a
general discussion of the abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity.
Judge Becker stated that the United States Supreme Court has noted the
eleventh amendment's importance in maintaining the balance of power
between state and federal interests; and that because of this importance,
the Supreme Court has been reluctant to infer abrogation of the eleventh amendment by federal statute. 24 In order to illustrate this point,
Judge Becker analyzed several Supreme Court cases which have addressed this issue.
The first case, Employees of Department of Public Health & Welfare v.
Missouri Department of Public Health & Welfare, 2 5 involved employees of a
state hospital who sued for overtime pay that they claimed they were
entitled to under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). 26 One section
of the FLSA gives employees whose employer is covered by the FLSA a
right of action against the employer to enforce the FLSA's terms. 2 7 The
definitional section, which has specifically excluded states from the
scope of the FLSA, was amended in 1966 to include state hospitals in
the class of employers regulated by the FLSA. 2 8 The Supreme Court
held that the eleventh amendment barred the action. 29 According to
Judge Becker, the Court reached this conclusion because it had not
found evidence of congressional intent on the specific issue of sovereign
30
immunity.
ment's action against Union Gas after dismissing Union Gas' third-party claim.
Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 376.
25. 411 U.S. 279 (1973). For a more detailed discussion of this case, see
infra notes 82-97 and accompanying text.
26. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 377. The Fair Labor Standards Act is codified at
29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. (1982).
27. At the time that Employees was decided, section 16(b) of the FLSA provided that "[a]ny employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7
of this Act shall be liable to the employee . . . affected in the amount of their
unpaid minimum wages .... An action to recover such liability may be maintained . . . in any court of competent jurisdiction .... ." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)
(1961) (amended 1974). For the text of the 1974 amended version of this provision, see infra note 98.

28. In 1966, the definition of "employer" was expanded to include a state
or a "political subdivision thereof" with respect to employees in "a hospital,
institution, or school." 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1966) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)
(1938)).
29. 411 U.S. at 285.
30. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 377. It is suggested that the Supreme Court did
not reach its conclusion on this basis alone. The Third Circuit noted one other
factor which did influence the Court's decision-the fact that the Secretary of
Labor was empowered to sue the state on the employee's behalf. Id. (citing Em-

ployees, 411 U.S. at 285-86).
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Judge Becker used a second case, Atascadero State Hospital v. ScanIon, 3 1 to emphasize the Supreme Court's statement that Congress must
express its intention to abrogate the eleventh amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself. 3 2 Atascadero involved the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which confers a right of action upon handicapped
people who have been discriminated against by "any recipient of Federal assistance."' 33 In that case, a plaintiff sought damages from a state
hospital that received federal assistance, but the Supreme Court held
that the eleventh amendment barred the suit, since abrogation could not
be effected by statutory language which merely granted "general author34
ization" for suit in federal court.
In the third case relied upon by Judge Becker, Hutto v. Finney, 35 the
Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
did abrogate state immunity. 36 The Court based its holding on the extensive legislative history of the Act which the Court reasoned had evidenced Congress' intent to abrogate state immunity.3 7 According to
31. 473 U.S. 234 (1985). The Court was split on this decision, 5-4.
32. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 376 (quoting Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 245-46). It is

likely that the Court's requirement that language of Congress' intent appear in
the statute itself was induced by the fact that plaintiffs based their argument on
language contained in regulations implemented pursuant to the Act in question.
See Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hosp., 735 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1984).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)(2) (as amended 1978).
34. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 245-46. The Court stated:
The statute thus provides remedies for violations of § 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] by "any recipient of Federal assistance." [Emphasis added by the Court.] There is no claim here that the State of California is
not a recipient of federal aid under the statute. But given their constitutional role, the States are not like any other class of recipients of federal aid. A general authorization for suit in federal court is not the kind
of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment. When Congress chooses to subject the States to federal
jurisdiction, it must do so specifically.

Id.
35. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
36. Id. at 696-97. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act is codified

at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).

37. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 694-95. The relevant statutory language involved in
Hutto was quite general, as it referred to neither the eleventh amendment nor
suits against states. Id. at 693-94. The statute provided only for the awarding of
attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a Civil Rights action. Id. Yet, the Court

held that states were not immune from suit in this case because of both the
purpose of the Act, and its extensive legislative history. Id. at 694. The legisla-

tive history included House and Senate Reports which explicitly endorsed the
payment of Attorney's fees by the states. Id. The Senate Report said that "itis
intended that the attorneys' fees, like other items of costs, will be collected
either directly from the official .... or from the State." Id. (quoting S. REP. No.
1011,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976)). The House Report states, "Of course, the
eleventh amendment is not a bar to the awarding of counsel fees against state
governments." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 n.14
(1976)). In addition to this history, the Court also found that the Act was enacted by the legislature specifically to restrain unlawful state action. Id. If the
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Judge Becker, Atascadero, although decided after Hutto, did not overrule
Hutto. 3 8 Judge Becker concluded that Hutto demonstrates that
"although a court may interpret a statute to abrogate states' eleventh
amendment immunity even in the absence of explicit statutory language
to that effect, the evidence in favor of such an interpretation must be
8' 9
virtually overwhelming."
Judge Becker, having reviewed the background concerning abrogation of the eleventh amendment, turned to address the specific arguments set forth by Union Gas in support of reading CERCLA as
abrogating the eleventh amendment. The first and most significant argument set forth by Union Gas is that sections 107 and 101 of CERCLA
jointly abrogate a state's immunity. 40 Under section 107 of CERCLA,
eleventh amendment barred the suit, according to the Court, the Act would in
effect create a right without a remedy. Id.
38. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 378.
39. Id.The Third Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had not always
insisted on the evidence of Congress' intent to abrogate the eleventh amend-

ment to be so explicit. Id. The majority notes as an example of the Supreme
Court's former view on this matter the case of Parden v. Terminal Railway Co.,
377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled, 107 S.Ct. 2941 (1987).

In Parden, the Supreme

Court held that the eleventh amendment did not bar a suit brought by employees against their employer, a state run railroad, under the Federal Employer's
Liability Act. Id.at 184-90. The Court held so, even though the Act did not
specifically mention "states" as potential defendants; rather, the Act imposes
liability only on a general class. Id. at 184. The Act provides that "[e]very common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several
States ...shall be liable...." 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1939). The Court did not make a
distinction between private-owned and state-owned railroads for the purposes of
liability. 377 U.S. at 188.
As the Third Circuit noted in Union Gas, however, the holding in Parden was
subsequently limited to instances in which the state is engaged in a for-profit
enterprise. 792 F.2d at 378, n.9 (citing Employees, 411 U.S. at 285). The Third
Circuit has also noted that one commentator has observed the shift in the
Supreme Court's stance on the eleventh amendment. Id. He has said that:
Parden would make states amenable to suit in federal court whenever
they undertake an activity for which a private person could potentially
be held liable under a valid federal law. The Parden majority thus posited no distinction between the states and other entities that might be
regulated by federal legislation. Employees .

. . ,

on the other hand, un-

derstand[s] states to be distinguished from other entities by federalism
considerations. For this reason, the amenability of states to suit must
be specifically addressed by federal legislation, and Congress must
make its intention to treat states like private parties unmistakably clear.
This policy of clear statement had been rejected by the Parden majority,
but . . .eventually prevailed.

Id. (quoting Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation; Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV.
682, 695 (1976)).

The Supreme Court has recently overruled Parden in Welch v. Department
of Highways & Public Transportation, 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987), thereby eliminat-

ing the need to find an analytical basis upon which Parden and Employees can
peacefully coexist.
40. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 379.
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regarding liability, any "person" who owns or operates a hazardous
waste site is liable for clean-up costs. 4 1 Section 101 defines the term

"person" in a manner that includes a "state." '4 2 Union Gas argued that
these sections, read together, abrogate Pennsylvania's eleventh amend43
ment immunity.
The Third Circuit countered this reasoning first by noting that section 107 of CERCLA, which creates the cause of action, is separate from
section 101, the definitional section which says that a "state" is a "person." 4 4 The Third Circuit then said it must use the reasoning in Employees to decide the issue in Union Gas because the United States Supreme
Court in that case interpreted a statutory arrangement similar to that of
CERCLA. 45 Judge Becker stated that the Supreme Court holding in Employees was that the mere inclusion of "states" within a class of potential
defendants in a statutory provision that is separate from the statutory
provision creating the liability is insufficient, in the absence of any
clearer indication of congressional intent, to show that Congress intended to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity. 46 The
Third Circuit in Union Gas held that it was bound to follow the holding in
47

Employees.

41. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982). For the text of this provision, see supra
note 9.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982). For the text of this provision, see supra
note 10.
43. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 379.
44. Id. The court found this arrangement of statutory provisions "insufficient to satisfy the burden of abrogation." Id.
45. Id. (citing Employees, 411 U.S. 279). For a discussion of the facts and
holding in Employees, see supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
46. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 379.
47. Id. In order to further justify its reading of sections 101 and 107 as not
abrogating the state's immunity, the court noted that section 107 performs a
meaningful function even when it is not construed as an abrogation of a state's
immunity. Id. at 380. This function consists of its enabling the United States to
sue states more easily for recoupment of its clean-up costs. Id. Under the statutory scheme, the United States Government does most of the initial clean-up.
Id. In order to sue for recoupment of its costs under the generous provisions of
CERCLA, the United States needs a cause of action. Id. CERCLA creates this
right. Id. (construing 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)). Without this provision, the United
States would have to sue each state under its own tort law. Id. at 379 n.14. For
an argument parallel to this one made by the Supreme Court in Employees, see
supra note 30. For a discussion of how these arguments differ, see infra note 93.
The court also noted that it did not have to rely upon Employees to reach its
decision, but could instead rely solely on CERCLA itself. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at
379. The court stated that the United States is included in the definition of
"person" in section 101(21). Id. Thus, if section 107(a) waived the states' immunity, it would also waive the United States' immunity. Id. The court noted,
however, that there is a separate CERCLA provision-107(g)-which explicitly
waives federal sovereign immunity. Id. This implies that section 107(a) does not
waive states' immunity. Id. The dissent disagreed with this interpretation, noting that no legislative history backs up this argument and that Congress was
merely being redundant by its inclusion of the waiver. Id. at 384 n. 1.
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In addition to its primary argument based on an interpretation of
sections 101 and 107 of CERCLA, Union Gas also argued that other
environmental laws specifically limit suits against states "to the extent
permitted by the eleventh amendment." '48 Since CERCLA does not
contain such a provision, Union Gas argued that the absence of such a
limitation is evidence that Congress intended to abrogate the eleventh
amendment. 4 9 The court rejected this argument, and held that no court
has read a statute to abrogate the eleventh amendment on the basis of
50
what the statute did not say.
A third argument put forth by Union Gas states that section
107(e)(2) of CERCLA, a subrogation provision, 5 1 allowed Union Gas to
subrogate to the rights of the United States against Pennsylvania once
the United States settled its case against Union Gas. 52 Since the United
States could sue Pennsylvania without the eleventh amendment barring
the suit, Union Gas argued that it too could sue Pennsylvania in federal
court through the device of subrogation. 5 3 Judge Becker also dismissed
this argument because neither section 107(e)(2) nor its legislative history contain evidence of Congress' intent to allow private parties "to
inherit all of the rights of the United States including the right to override the states' right not to be sued by private citizens in federal
court[.]'54

Union Gas' fourth and final argument focused upon the broad policy underlying the CERCLA legislation as expressed in its legislative history. 5 5 Union Gas argued that since Congress intended CERCLA to
48. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 381. The court found that in other environmental statutes the legislature specifically provided that citizens' suits under the statutes were specifically limited by the eleventh amendment. Id.; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604(a)(1) (1982) (Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1) (1982) (Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1982) (Federal Water
Pollution Control Act). CERCLA does not contain a similar provision for citizens' suits, but there are bills currently in Congress that would amend CERCLA
to allow for citizens' suits limited by the eleventh amendment. Union Gas, 792
F.2d at 381-82.
49. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 381.
50. Id. at 382.
51. Section 107(e)(2) of CERCLA provides that "[n]othing in this title ...
shall bar a cause of action that ... any ... person subject to liability under this
section . . . has or would have, by reason of subrogation."
42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(e)(2) (1982).
52. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 380.
53. Id. Suits brought by the United States against a state are not barred by
the eleventh amendment. United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
54. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 380.
55. Id. The House Report relied upon by Union Gas says that CERCLA was
intended "to initiate and establish a comprehensive response and financing
mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated with ... hazardous
waste disposal sites." Id. (quoting from H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d

Sess. 22 (1980)).
The Senate Report relied upon by Union Gas says CERCLA "is designed to
help address many of the problems faced by society as a result of chemical con-
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establish a comprehensive response and financing mechanism for dealing with problems associated with hazardous waste sites, it must also
have intended to abrogate states' immunity, or else CERCLA would be
less than "comprehensive." '5 6 Judge Becker viewed this as the least effective argument since it relies solely on legislative history, and not the
statute itself.5 7 Unlike the statute in Hutto,5 8 CERCLA's legislative his-

tory nowhere mentions the eleventh amendment or suits against
states. 5 9 Judge Becker stated that the existence of the word "comprehensive" in the legislative history "is commonplace and may be little
more than political hyperbole;" and concluded, therefore, that this language cannot bear the evidentiary burden necessary to abrogate the
60
eleventh amendment.
Judge Higginbotham, in his dissenting opinion in Union Gas,6 1 argued that the definitional section of CERCLA, which declares unequivocally that "person" includes "state," read together with the liability
section imposing liability on "persons," is sufficient evidence to show
that the legislature intended to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment
immunity. 62 Judge Higginbotham emphasized that such an abrogation

does not require the legislature to specifically say that "the eleventh
'63
amendment's prohibition on suits against states does not apply."
Judge Higginbotham spent most of his dissent showing how the majority misinterpreted the Supreme Court's holdings in Employees and
Atascadero. Judge Higginbotham first argued that the Supreme Court's
holding in Employees does not decide the issue in Union Gas because the
tamination." Id. at 381 (quoting from S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12
(1980)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. For a discussion of Hutto, see supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
59. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 381. The majority noted that "[t]he issue of
states' immunity was never squarely addressed by either house of Congress in
the CERCLA debates. The eleventh amendment was mentioned not once in any
document or discussion pertaining to CERCLA." Id. at 381 n.16.
60. Id. at 381.
61. Id. at 383 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
62. Id. (Higginbotham,J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21)).
63. Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Judge Higginbotham in his dissent
observed that:
[i]n the future, to comply with the rationale of the majority, in definitional sections of similar statutes where remedies are provided for damages citizens or corporations have suffered, Congress must use
language similar to the following: 'The term person includes a state,
and we really mean the state, and furthermore the eleventh amendment's prohibition against the states does not apply.' In matters of
statutory construction of legislation that is as explicit as the statute in
issue, no other court has imposed as broad a reading of eleventh
amendment prohibitions.
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facts in it are "patently distinguishable" from those in Union Gas.6 4
Judge Higginbotham argued that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
interpreted in Employees, which provides a cause of action for employees
against employers for overtime pay due, differs from CERCLA because
the FLSA is ambiguous on the issue of state's immunity while CERCLA
is not. 65 According to the dissent, this ambiguity was spawned by the

amendments made to the FLSA in 1966.66 Prior to the 1966 amendments, "state" was not mentioned in the liability section, which dealt
with the liability of "any employer."'6 7 Judge Higginbotham noted that
at this same time, the definitional section of the statute defined "employer" and specifically mentioned the fact that states were not included
within the definition. 68 Judge Higginbotham further noted that when
amendments to the FLSA were made in 1966, the definition of "employer" was expanded to specifically include states, 69 while the liability
section of the statute remained unchanged. 70 Although it may be argued that the amendment to the definitional section abrogated the eleventh amendment, the Supreme Court in Employees held that no such
abrogation was effected by the amendments. 7 1 The dissent disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that the holding in Employees was based
simply on "the absence of any clear indication of congressional intent to
abrogate states' eleventh amendment immunity." '7 2 According to Judge
Higginbotham, the Supreme Court held as it did because there was an
ambiguity created by the legislature's amending the definitional provision of FLSA without amending the liability provision. 73 The dissent
reasoned that, given these contradictory sections, the Supreme Court
could not find a clear intention of Congress in the FLSA to abrogate the
eleventh amendment since these sections could be construed to either
deny or allow states to be subject to suit in federal court.74 The dissent
64. Id. at 384 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Employees,
see supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
65. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 385 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
66. Id. (Higginbotham,J., dissenting). For the text of these provisions, see
supra notes 27 and 28.
67. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1961) (amended 1974).
68. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 385 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing 29
U.S.C. § 203(d) (1938)).
69. Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1966)
amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1938)).
70. Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing Employees v. Missouri Public
Health Dept., 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973)).
72. Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
73. Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting); see also Welch v. State Dep't of Highways and Public Transp., 780 F.2d 1268, 1284 (5th Cir. 1986) ("In Eniployees, the
Court's reluctance to find the necessary intention to include the states within the
FLSA was influenced by Congress' confusing amendments.") (Brown, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 58 (1986), aft'd, 107 S. Ct. 1941 (1987).
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concluded from this analysis that since CERCLA does not have a history
of amendments which spawns such ambiguity, Employees can be distinguished from Union Gas. 7 5 Thus, he concludes, the mere inclusion of
"states" as "persons" in CERCLA is sufficient evidence of Congress'
76
intent to abrogate states' eleventh amendment immunity.
The dissent also criticized the majority's use of Atascadero in reaching its holding in Union Gas. 7 7 Judge Higginbotham noted that the statute involved in Atascadero, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, defined the
class of potential defendants as "any recipient of federal assistance,"
and did not include specific statutory language identifying the types of
recipients of federal aid. 7 8 CERCLA, on the other hand, specifically
identifies the class of potential defendants who may be liable under its
provisions, and a "state" is included. 79 After drawing this distinction,
Judge Higginbotham concluded that, unlike the statute in Atascadero,
"CERCLA allows states to be subjected to suit by private persons," and
that such a conclusion is supported "in 'unmistakable language in the
statute itself,' " thereby meeting the rule of construction articulated by
Atascadero.80
As the dissent pointed out, the majority in Union Gas misapplied the
two United States Supreme Court cases-Employees and Atascaderowhich it relied upon in reaching its decision. But there are additional
shortcomings in the Third Circuit's opinion in Union Gas which the dissent failed to illuminate, particularly in the court's use of Employees to
dispose of the case. 8 '
75. 792 F.2d at 385 (Higginbotham,J., dissenting). The dissent stated that
in the case at bar "we are not confronted with a statute which at one time declared that a person 'shall not include the United States or any State or political
subdivision of a State.' But to the contrary, here, we have the original statute,
never amended for purposes relevant to this case, that has always declared that
the state was a person for liability purposes." Id. (Higginbotham,J., dissenting).
76. Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). In reaching the conclusion, Judge
Higginbotham said that:
Judge Cardozo . . . so wisely observed that: '[in countless litigations,
the law is so clear that judges have no discretion. They have the right
to legislate within gaps, but often there are no gaps. We shall have a
false view of the landscape if we look at the waste spaces only, and refuse to see the acres already sown and fruitful.' In this case, from my
view the majority has failed to look at the landscape and appreciate the
clear statutory language of Congress.
Id. at 386 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
77. Id. at 385-86 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 385 (Higginbotham,J., dissenting). For a discussion of Atascadero,
see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
79. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 386 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1982)).
80. Id. (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (quoting from Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985)).
81. This article focuses only upon the Third Circuit's use and interpretation of Supreme Court case law in its own opinion. The statutory argument
made by the court based solely on its interpretation of CERCLA, is not the focus
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It is crucial to recognize that Employees does not stand for the proposition imputed to it by the Union Gas court, that "the inclusion of 'states'
within the class of potential defendants is insufficient to abrogate" a
state's immunity. 82 Employees neither states nor stands for such a proposition. Rather, in Employees the Supreme Court held that in that particular factual situation the eleventh amendment was not abrogated.
Although Employees may be cited as standing for the proposition that
Congress, if it wishes to do so, must manifest its intent to abrogate the
eleventh amendment clearly, 83 there is no authority for citing it as
standing for the proposition attributed to it by the Third Circuit.
Employees is one of numerous cases decided by the Supreme Court
which, taken together, create a special set of rules of statutory construction of which Congress must be aware if it wants to make manifest its
intention to abrogate the states' eleventh amendment immunity. 84 In
Atascadero, the most recent of these cases, Justice Brennan noted in his
dissent that such "special rules of statutory drafting" were "designed as
hurdles to keep the disfavored suits out of federal court."'8 5 It is suggested that Justice Brennan's view is only partially correct. The Court
does indeed mean to design "hurdles" which one must overcome before
suing a state in federal court, but not for the dubious purpose of keeping "disfavored suits" out of federal court. Rather, the Court is concerned about maintaining "the usual constitutional balance between the
states and Federal Government." '8 6 This concern manifests itself most
of this analysis, even though the court's holding may be able to rest independently on that basis alone. For a discussion of the statutory argument, see supra
note 47.
82. 792 F.2d at 379 (citing Employees, 411 U.S. 279 (1973)). Although the
court states that Employees stands for such a proposition, the Supreme Court's
opinion no where enunciates such a rule.
83. 411 U.S. 279 (1973). Employees will not have to be used as often for this
proposition, now that the Court has more explicitly announced this rule in Atascadero. For a discussion of Atascadero, see supra notes 31-34 and accompanying
text.
84. See Employees, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (Congress must make its intention
"clear" if it sought to lift states' eleventh amendment immunity); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (waiver by state of state's immunity will be found
only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from text as will leave no room for any other reasonable construction);
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 651 (1984) (to abrogate states' immunity an unequivocal expression of congressional intent is required); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (Congress
must express its intention to abrogate eleventh amendment in unmistakable language in statute itself).
85. Atascadero, 473 U.S. 234, 254 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan has been consistently on the side of the court which favors subjecting
the states to suit in federal court. See, e.g., Employees, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled,
107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86. See, e.g., Atascadero, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (eleventh amendment
serves to maintain balance of power between states and federal government);
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poignantly in Employees. 8 7 The Third Circuit, however, overlooks the
Court's concern with the "constitutional balance between the states and
Federal Government," and consequently it misinterprets the rationale
88
behind the Supreme Court's conclusion in Employees.
The dissent in Union Gas disagreed with the majority's reading of
Employees, but the dissent only focused on the differences between the
statutory language involved in each case. 8 9 The Supreme Court's decision in Employees was influenced not only by the ambiguous amendments
to the FLSA but also by its concern for the delicate "constitutional balance" between states and the Federal Government. 90
The Supreme Court in Employees was reluctant to find that Congress
abrogated the states' immunity in the FLSA for two reasons: the "enormous fiscal burden" that such legislation would put on the states;9 1 and
the pervasive effect that such a federal scheme of regulation would have
on the states. 9 2 Since abrogation of the states' immunity would lead to
these consequences, the Court was reluctant to infer that Congress desired to abrogate the eleventh amendment. 9 3 Thus, it seems that in orGarcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 572 (1985) (Powell,
J., dissenting) ("constitutionally mandated balance of power" between the states
and Federal Government was adopted by Framers to ensure protection of "our
fundamental liberties"); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89 (1984) (Court is reluctant to infer that state's immunity has been neglected because of "the vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our
federal system.").
87. Employees, 411 U.S. at 286. The Court was concerned with the effect
that the interpretation of FLSA would have on the delicate federal-state relationship. Id.
88. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 379. The Third Circuit in Union Gas used Employees to support its finding that when a suggestion that states might be sued is
found in a provision of a statute separate from the provision that creates the
cause of action, the statutory arrangement is insufficient to satisfy the burden of
abrogation. Id. The court, however, never considered the delicate federal-state
relationship in making its finding. Id.
89. Id. at 384-86 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
dissent's reading of Employees, see supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
90. See 411 U.S. at 286. The Supreme Court in Employees does not speak of
"constitutional balance"-which is language from Atascadero-but rather of "the
delicate federal-state relationship." Id. at 286.
91. Id. at 284. The Court stated: "[W]hen Congress does [enact legislation
that regulates state activity], it may place new or even enormous fiscal burdens
on the States. Congress, acting responsibly, would not be presumed to take

such action silently." Id. at 284-85.
92. Id. at 285. The Court stated: "We deal here with problems that may
well implicate elevator operators,janitors, charwomen, security guards, secretaries, and the like in every office building in a State's governmental hierarchy." Id.
93. Id. The Court stated: "It is not easy to infer that Congress in legislating
pursuant to the Commerce Clause, which has grown to vast proportions in its
applications, desired silently to deprive the States of an immunity they have long
enjoyed under another part of the Constitution." Id.
Besides considering the vast implications that FLSA would have for states if
it were to apply to them, the Court in Employees was also influenced by the fact
that the Secretary of Labor is empowered by FLSA to enforce the Act. Id. at
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der to determine whether Congress had abrogated the eleventh
amendment when it enacted the FLSA, the Court speculated as to what
the potential consequences to the states would be if they were subjected
94
to suit in federal courts under the FLSA.
The Third Circuit in Union Gas overlooked the Supreme Court's
concern in Employees with the vast implications that FLSA would have for
the states. As a consequence, the court mistakenly turned the specific
holding in Employees into a general proposition, and mechanically applied it to the facts in Union Gas. 9 5 In essence, the Supreme Court in
Employees said that the inclusion of "states" within the class of potential
defendants is insufficient, in this particular situation, to abrogate the
state's immunity. 96 The Third Circuit's interpretation of this holding
'97
would leave out the phrase "in this particular situation."
In addition to these problems with applying Employees to the facts in
285-86. The Secretary of Labor can sue states in federal court because suits by
the United States in federal court are not barred by the eleventh amendment.
Id. at 286 (citing United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965)).
Since state employees could be protected under FLSA by the Secretary of Labor's ability to sue the states, the Court concluded that "[t]he policy of the Act
so far as the States are concerned is wholly served by allowing the delicate federal-state relationship to be managed through the Secretary of Labor." Id. With
this reasoning, the Court was able to make meaningful the legislature's extension of FLSA to include state employees under its umbrella in the 1966 amendments. Id. at 285.
The Third Circuit tried in Union Gas to make an argument analogous to the
one from Employees, when it said that section 107 of CERCLA performs a "meaningful function" even when it is not construed as an abrogation of state immunity. 792 F.2d at 380. This function, the court concluded, was to provide a right
of action for the United States against the states for re-coupment of its clean-up
costs. Id. But this argument differs significantly from the one in Employees. In

Employees, the Supreme Court noted that the private parties could still be protected by FLSA, even though they work for the State. 411 U.S. at 279. In Union
Gas, the court still has not found a way for CERCLA to protect private parties'
rights when these are infringed upon by a state.
94. Employees, 411 U.S. at 284-86. The Court has never explicitly acknowledged that it was performing a "balancing test" of state and federal interests
before determining whether the statute abrogated the state's immunity. Id. One
author has pointed out that this balancing test is often masked by the Court's
apparent concern with statutory interpretation. See Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 167-69 (1977).
95. 792 F.2d at 379. This occurred when the Third Circuit said: "[W]e are
bound by Employees to find that the inclusion of 'States' within the class of potential defendants is insufficient to abrogate Pennsylvania's immunity. Id. The
Supreme Court did not set forth such a proposition in Employees; rather, the
Third Circuit derived this proposition from the specific facts and holding of Employees. The Third Circuit then decided Union Gas by analogy to Employees. Id.
96. Employees, 411 U.S. at 284-85. The particular situation in Employees involved the possibility of placing an enormous fiscal burden on the states with a
federal statutory scheme that would have a pervasive regulatory effect on state
activity if the scheme were to be applied to the states. Id.
97. Union Gas, 792 F.2d at 379. The Third Circuit only considered the fact
that the inclusion of states as potential defendants was in a provision separate
from the one creating the plaintiff's cause of action. Id. Since the statutory ar-
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Union Gas, there is also the fact that the decision in Employees was
specifically overruled by Congress.9 8 The subsequent amendments
made to the FLSA by Congress in 1974, making Congress' intention
unmistakably clear with respect to the amenability of states to suit in
Federal Court, sheds doubt on the validity of Employees as a reliable
guide to general problems of statutory interpretation. Congress' swift
response to Employees clearly indicates that, contrary to what the
Supreme Court held, Congress did intend to abrogate the eleventh
amendment when it made amendments in 1966. 99 As a guide for interrangement interpreted in Employees was similar in this respect to that in Union
Gas, the Third Circuit felt obligated to follow Employees. Id.
98. The Third Circuit recognized this fact in a 1975 decision, stating that
"[t]he legislative history of the 1974 amendments to the FLSA makes clear the
fact that the amendment to this section was expressly designed to overcome the
ruling in Employees." Dunlop v. New Jersey, 522 F.2d 504, 515 n.20 (3d Cir.
1975), vacated, 427 U.S. 909 (1976) (citing 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
2850, 2853 (1974)).
The amendments made to the FLSA in 1974 changed the two provisions
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Employees. For the text of these provisions
as they existed in 1973, see supra notes 27-28.
Congress amended Section 16(b), the liability provision of FLSA, by changing it from the ambiguous "[a]ction to recover such liability may be maintained
in any court of competent jurisdiction," to the clearer language of "[aln action
to recover the liability prescribed ... may be maintained against any employer
(including a public agency) in any Federal or State Court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves
and other employees similarly situated." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1974) (amending
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1961)).
99. It did not take long, however, for the Supreme Court to strike down the
1974 amendments to FLSA as being unconstitutional. In National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Court held that Congress, though not
overreaching its power pursuant to the Commerce Clause to regulate such activity, did violate states' sovereignty protections afforded by the tenth amendment.
Id. at 852. The Court drew a distinction between traditional and non-traditional
governmental functions, and stated that Congress cannot enact legislation which
"operate[s] to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." Id.
The Supreme Court in National League was deeply divided in its 5-4 plurality
decision, and was again divided by 5-4 when it overruled this case in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia, the
Court did away with the "traditional governmental functions" protection afforded by the Court in National League. Id. at 539-43.
It is interesting to note that all the dissenters in Garcia accounted for four of
the five Justices in the majority for Atascadero. This is hardly surprising, since
Atascadero offers protection to states from having to litigate in Federal Courts,
while Garcia, in effect, limits such protection. For a discussion of how these
apparently conflicting cases can be seen as consistent when viewed in light of the
policies underlying the tenth and eleventh amendments, see Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amendment Survived the Death of the
Tenth: Some Broader Implications, 74 GEo. L.J. 363 (1985).
The issue of whether Congress would have the power to regulate state activity with the CERCLA legislation was not addressed by the Court in Union Gas,
but if the plaintiffs were able to surpass the eleventh amendment defense, this
issue would surely be the next one to address.
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preting statutes and determining Congress' intent, therefore, Employees
is not reliable. This is not to say, however, that the decision in Employees
itself was wrong. Rather, Employees serves to further emphasize that the
Supreme Court is unlikely to infer abrogation of the eleventh amendment in circumstances where the evidence for abrogation is not unmistakably clear, and the potential adverse consequences to the states of
abrogating the eleventh amendment are extremely great.
It seems, then, that in order for the Third Circuit to truly "follow"
the reasoning in Employees, it is suggested that the court would have to
determine what the potential consequences to the states would be if they
were subjected to suit in federal court under CERCLA before it determined what amount of evidence would be necessary to appear in CERCLA in order to make manifest Congress' intent to abrogate the states'
eleventh amendment immunity.10 0 This analysis would include consideration of a number of factors. These would include: whether subjecting states to suit in federal court under CERCLA would place
"enormous fiscal burdens" on the states;lt whether the CERCLA legis10 2
lation would have a "pervasive regulatory effect" on state activity;
whether the interests protected by CERCLA are of such a national character that state interests are secondary to it;10 3 and whether the state
100. For a discussion of this procedure as used by the Supreme Court in
Employees, see supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
101. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 284.

102. See id. at 285. The Supreme Court in Employees implied that not all
federal legislation would have a "pervasive regulatory effect" on the states if it
were to apply to them. Id. For instance, the Court distinguished Parden v. Terminal Railway Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled, 107 S.Ct. 2941 (1987), from
Employees on this basis. The statute involved in Parden-theFederal Employers'
Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et. seq.-provided a right of action against
everyone who operates a railroad." 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1908). The Court in
Parden did not require the statute to mention "states" in order to make the statute apply to states. Parden, 377 U.S. at 188. The eleventh amendment was held
as not barring the suit brought by a state employee against the state in federal
court. Id. at 196 (specific holding from Parden was overruled in Welch v. Department of Highways & Pub. Transp., 107 S.Ct. 2941, 2968 (1987)). The Court in
Employees, however, said that the "rather isolated state activity [involved in
Parden] can be put to one side. We deal here with problems that may well implicate elevator operators, janitors.... secretaries.... in every office building in a
State's governmental hierarchy." 411 U.S. at 285. Obviously, CERCLA would
not have such a pervasive effect on the states. It would only affect state activity
which related to hazardous waste sites. CERCLA's effect on states, therefore,
would not be as pervasive as FLSA is.
103. There are circumstances in which federal interests have been held to
be paramount to state interests. For instance, the eleventh amendment does not
apply when suit is brought against a state official in federal court to enjoin the
official from enforcing a state statute which is allegedly unconstitutional. Ex
Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) ("[T]he Young doctrine has been accepted as
necessary to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state
officials responsible to 'the supreme authority of the U.S.' ").
In his concurrence to National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
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activity which gave rise to the cause of action was "proprietary," as op10 4
posed to "exclusively governmental."
The problems associated with determining the extent of states' immunity to suit brought by private parties in federal court, even in light of
the seemingly clear rules set out by recent Supreme Court decisions
5
concerning congressional abrogation of the immunity, 10 remain ex06
The Third Circuit's opinion in Union Gas, in its
tremely complex.1
mechanical application of select language from Employees and Atascadero,
conceals the difficult policy issues which underlie the law in this area.
David M. Augustine

(1976), Justice Blackmun, addressing the related issue of whether Congress has
the power to regulate certain state activities, said that "[the Court] adopts a balancing approach [for deciding not to extend Congress's regulatory power to the
setting of minimum wage requirements for state employees], and does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the federal
interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential." Id. at 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
104. The distinction between "proprietary" and "governmental" activity
was drawn by the Supreme Court in Employees to distinguish Parden v. Terminal
Railway Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled, 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987), from the
situation involved in Employees. The Court said: "Parden involved the railroad
business which Alabama operated 'for profit.' Parden was in the area where private persons and corporations normally ran the enterprise. State mental hospitals, state cancer hospitals, and training schools for delinquent girls which are
not operated for profit are not proprietary." 411 U.S. at 284 (footnotes
omitted).
The Supreme Court in Parden said that "when a state leaves the sphere that
is exclusively its own and enters into activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that regulation as fully as if it were a private person or
corporation." Parden, 377 U.S. at 196. Employees modified the holding in Parden
by not treating states as private persons in all situations in which it performs an
activity that would make a private person subject to congressional regulation.
Instead, the Court upheld the states' immunity when the state was engaged in a
non-proprietary activity. In such a situation, the Court required a more explicit
showing of congressional intent to abrogate the state's immunity. Employees, 411
U.S. at 285. Such a distinction is probably less relevant today with the Court's
opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528
(1985), which expressly disposed of such a distinction when dealing with state
activity. For a discussion of Garcia, see supra note 94. It is unclear, however,
whether the Garciaanalysis could be applied to this issue in eleventh amendment
jurisprudence since it deals with the tenth amendment.
In any event, the Supreme Court will no longer feel obliged to account for
the decision in Parden when making decisions based on the eleventh amendment
since Parden has recently been overruled. See Welch v. Dept. of Highways & Pub.
Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
105. For a discussion of the instability of the Supreme Court's decisions in
this area, see supra note 99.
106. For a discussion of various views and continuing disputes in the area
of eleventh amendment jurisprudence, see supra notes 1-2.
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